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Abstract
This paper explores alternative ﬁnancing mechanisms to pay for the ﬁxed costs of roads,
particularly in cases without rising marginal costs. Mechanisms considered include tolls,
gasoline taxes, and developer payments. The problems with each are discussed. An
example looking at problems of temporal and spatial free-riding is presented.
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Public ﬁnance economists often suggest pricing of public facilities in the
form of a three-part tariﬀ (Blewett and Nelson, 1988). The ﬁrst part reﬂects
a charge for the capital facility (for example major highways). The second
part is the charge for bringing the facility (for example local streets) to the
user, and is usually covered by the private sector in constructing a new
subdivision. The third part is a charge based on actual use, and is analogous
to congestion pricing.
In recent decades, the third part of the tariﬀ, user charges, and especially
dynamic charges, has seen a great deal of attention in the academic commu-
nity (see de Palma and Lindsey, 1997; Viton, 1995; Walton and Euritt,
1990), but more importantly in practice, particularly with the development
of High Occupancy/Toll (or HOT) lanes in the United States (Elliott, 1975;
Fielding and Klein, 1993; Sullivan, 1998), cordon charges in Norway
(Larsen, 1995), distance based charges for freight in Germany (Rothen-
gatter, 2004), and area based charges in Singapore (Field, 1992; Holland
and Watson, 1978) and London (Bell et al., 2004). Clearlythere is resistance
to user charges, which serve both to manage roadways by temporally or
spatially redistributing traﬃc, and to raise revenue. They are signiﬁcantly
more complex and require a much larger bureaucracy to administer than
more traditional road ﬁnancing measures that rely on taxes. Reports
from the London Congestion Charge indicate administrative costs upwards
of 67 per cent of revenue raised (Hensher, 2003), and other toll based
systems typically lose 20–25 per cent of their revenue to administration,
which is signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient as a revenue-raising scheme than petrol
taxes, which often lose less than 1 per cent of revenue to administrative
processes (Wachs, 2003).
The ﬁrst and second parts of the tariﬀ, paying for the ﬁxed costs of
roads, especially when marginal costs are not rising, has not seen the
same level of academic interest. Yet there are a number of complexities
because of the variety of vehicles using roads, the spatial structure of
networks, the varying lengths of trips, multiple levels of government, and
long life of infrastructure.
This paper reviews the issues around paying for the ﬁxed costs of roads.
Over history, a number of diﬀerent approaches have been tried; some more
appropriate to their context than others, and some that may see new life as
changes in the underlying environment of transport network ﬁnance takes
place. The next section considers the classiﬁcation of roads, both function-
ally, economically, and by ownership. This is followed by a review of the
history surrounding the evolution of road ﬁnancing in the Anglo-American
context. The charging of developers, which can take a variety of forms, is
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280considered. Then an example, illustrating some of the many issues, is
provided. The paper concludes with some thoughts on the future of funding
the ﬁxed costs of roads.
2.0 Classifying Roads
Roads serve many purposes, but broadly they can be organised along two
dimensions, providing access to land and serving the function of move-
ment, and of course some roads do more of one than the other. Roads
that serve movement tend to be faster and have higher capacities (serve
more vehicles per hour), while those that serve land access will be slower
with lower capacities. This distinction gives rise to the hierarchy of roads
found on any network and described in many transport engineering
texts. Figure 1 illustrates the concept, where roads tend to fall along the
diagonal.
This hierarchy, applicable with relabelling to other modes, explains a lot
about transport ﬁnancing and, when we discuss road ﬁnancing, we have at
least three distinct types of facilities that each require diﬀerent means. The
ﬁrst and second parts of the tariﬀ correspond to the top and bottom of the
hierarchy respectively. Underlying that tariﬀ is an assumption that roads
are public facilities. However, the issue of ﬁnancing cannot be isolated
from the issue of ownership (public vs. private), nor, within the public
sector, of which level of government manages the road, nor how private
sector roads are regulated. Economists often deﬁne public and private
goods using the dimensions of rivalry and excludability, as summarised
in Table 1.
Figure 1
Functional Highway Classiﬁcation and Type of Service Provided
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281Table 1 suggests that limited access arterials, including fully restricted
facilities such as freeways, as well as major signalised arterials with limited
driveway access, exhibit, with toll technologies, the properties of exclud-
ability and rivalry (congestion), making them, in economic parlance,
private goods. The recent experience with private roads in the United
States has been mixed at best. Southern California’s privately built
median toll lanes of SR91 were recently taken over by the Orange
County Transportation Authority (which operates other toll roads in the
county) for $207.5 million in cash and assumed debt (Level 3 Communica-
tions, 2003). This takeover was prompted by increasing congestion in the
corridor, which the public was unable to remedy because the franchise
agreement given to the private owners prohibited expansion of competing
facilities. The privately built Dulles Greenway in Virginia has also had a
mixed experience, though is now doing better than it was in its early
years when it had to restructure its debt and lower tolls to attract traﬃc,
having recently expanded capacity to accommodate demand and raised
toll rates (Wooldridge et al., 2002). Like California’s experience with
SR91, Spain, France, and Italy established private concessions to operate
toll roads in the post World War II era, though many of these were
either consolidated or taken over by the national government. Eastern
European Countries have followed in the post Cold War Era. Many
developing countries in Asia and Latin America use private toll roads for
intercity transport, with a variety of diﬀerent concession strategies and
varying levels of success (Cobin, 1999; Gomez-Iban ˜ ez and Meyer, 1993;
Hambros, 1999; McCormack and Rauch, 1997).
In contrast, local streets are, or can be, excludable — gated communities
being the classic example — but because of their low levels of traﬃc, are not
rivalrous, suggesting they are club goods (Buchanan, 1965; Cornes and
Sandler, 1996). These club goods are generally publicly owned, but may
also be private, as in St Louis (Hunter, 1988). Benton Place in St Louis is
the oldest such private street in the United States (Beito and Smith, 1990;
Lafayette Square Marquis, 1998), wherein the adjoining properties are
Table 1
Public, Private, Club, and ‘Congesting’ Goods
Excludability
Yes No
Rivalry Yes Private ‘Congesting’
Limited Access Arterials Linking Collectors
No Club Public
Local Streets
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annually for maintenance. Laid out across private lots, Benton Place was
designed to control traﬃc and, like the Dutch Woonerf, to allow use of
the road space for public activity such as children’s play.
The middle level of roads may suﬀer congestion, but are not really
excludable, as they connect local streets with each other and with limited
access arterials, and typically serve many adjoining businesses, putting
them in a third category.
Levinson and Yerra (2002) examine the issue of which level of govern-
ment should pay for roads: local governments are closer to the problem,
but may not be able to attain scale economies, while state governments,
which can achieve some economies, may have problems of span of control.
Levinson and Yerra ﬁnd that there is a share of expenditures by each level
of government on each highway class, which results in a minimum expendi-
ture for each funding category (both capital and operating expenses).
3.0 Rights of Passage
The word ‘road’ from the Old English ‘rad’ shares its root with the modern
word ‘ride’, and in that etymology is an important understanding of what
roads were historically: rights of passage, places where one could ride
acrosspropertyheldbyanother.In1285,theStatuteofWestminster,appar-
ently the earliest English law concerning the subject of road maintenance
required of manors ‘...that highways leading from one market town to
another shall be enlarged where as bushes, woods, or dykes be, so that
there be neither dyke nor bush whereby a man may lurk to do hurt within
two hundred feet of the one side and two hundred feet of the other side of
the way’ (Webb and Webb, 1913). The assumption is that the manors main-
tained roads (rights-of-way) across their property, and were responsible for
ensuring no danger. There were in this same era more important streets and
roads, which would be maintained by other organisations. For instance, in
England, Catholic monasteries often maintained roadways along major
pilgrimage routes, a practice that came to an end with Henry VIII’s break
with Rome and the creation of the Anglican church.
Changing social and economic relationships led over a period of
centuries to the replacement of the statute labour system of building
roads to one of turnpike authorities. The Highways Act of 1555 established
a process whereby surveyors, reporting to Quarter Sessions (quarterly
meetings equivalent to a modern County Council) would be elected to
supervise four (and later six) days per year of statute labour from adult
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their way out of this service by providing capital, including in-kind capital
such as horses and tools, as well as the more generic money), a procedure
that lasted to 1835 (Albert, 1972; Pawson, 1977; Webb and Webb, 1913).
The problem with statute labour rather than money as a means for ﬁnan-
cing road construction is the resulting productivity problem. While workers
can be forced to report to duty, they cannot be made to work hard, and
perhaps equally importantly, because of the temporary nature of their
servitude, they are not likely to work skilfully or eﬃciently, and are
unable to obtain the eﬃciencies associated with an appropriate division
of labour.
The solution to this problem is a paid, and somewhat better skilled,
labour force, which then raises the question of how to raise revenue to
pay for labour. The answer, once it began emerging in the late 17th century,
was obvious: place tolls on the roads. The nature of tolls varied from place
to place; the ﬁrst to be tolled were the heavy vehicles (especially those on
narrow wheels) that rutted the unpaved roads of the day. As the economy
continued to grow during the 18th century, heavier and heavier freight was
being transported longer and longer distances, damaging more and more
road surfaces. The English Parliament passed enabling legislation allowing
communities to establish tolls, something especially important for commu-
nities with a lot of through traﬃc that did not add to the local economy but
did damage local roads. Bogart (2003, 2004) provides evidence that these
non-proﬁt turnpike trusts did provide better quality roads, lowering the
costs of carrier services (carriage), illustrating the trade-oﬀ between invest-
ing in capital (the roads) and investing in labour and services. Bogart (2005)
provides statistical evidence that communities in the United Kingdom that
had more through traﬃc were more likely to toll their roads.
In the US, toll roads were generally proﬁt-seeking local companies,
whose stock in part was owned by local governments and in part by local
investors. While proﬁt-seeking, they were often not proﬁt-making, a fact
that was well-known; Klein (1990) suggests that investment by local elites
was viewed as a social obligation to help the community develop as
much as, if not more than, an attempt to earn a high rate of return.
The technology for enforcing tolls was quite simple: the turnpike, a
spear placed across the road that would lift when the toll was paid.
While traﬃc levels were relatively low, the only inconvenience of such
technology is the requirement of having change, and the stopping to pay
someone in a tollbooth or tollhouse. Toll road (as well as canal and river
navigation and railroad) operators strove to maximise revenue, and this
meant developing means to price-discriminate between diﬀerent customer
classes, which became increasingly complex as the industry matured
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284(Odlyzko, 2004). As traﬃc levels grew, especially in the 20th century
incarnation of toll roads, delay at these tollbooths became another incon-
venience. Toll farming, the leasing of the right to collect tolls in exchange
for a ﬁxed sum, became a widespread (if unpopular) practice throughout
Europe, much like tax farming (Albert, 1972; Turvey, 2003).
This ﬁrst toll era lasted until the second half of the 19th century.
Competition from railroads took away long-distance business, and thus
revenue, from toll roads (Baer et al., 1993). Toll roads, which operated at
the suﬀerance of government, were not especially popular with users
(Albert, 1979), and when the opportunities arose, the roads were disturn-
piked and taken over by local, county, or state governments. The new
government management, accompanied by the good roads movement of
the late 19th century, led a further improvement in roads, and the paving
of roads in the early 20th century was concomitant with the rise of the
bicycle and then motor car as modes of transport. Until the advent of
the gasoline tax, special assessments and general government revenue
were used to pay for road improvements.
Figure 2 shows the history of the federal gasoline tax in the United
States and in one state, Minnesota. The federal tax followed by a decade
Figure 2
United States and Minnesota Gasoline Tax and Allocation
Sources: Buechner, William (n.d.) History of the Gasoline Tax. American Road and Transportation
Builders Association, http://www.artba.org/economics_research/reports/gas_tax_history.htm
Ryan, Barry, Presentation at Oberstar Forum, University of Minnesota, 17 April 2005
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used primarily in the transportation sector for the funding of capital
projects rather than operations or maintenance. In the US, unlike other
countries (Newbery and Santos, 1999), the tax has been largely earmarked
(or hypothecated) to roads. Within both the authorising legislation passed
every six years or so, and the annual appropriations bills, there is further
earmarking, so that funds are dedicated to speciﬁc projects (Utt, 1999).
However, the gasoline tax has not kept pace with inﬂation, indicating a
real drop in funds available for new road construction since peaking in
the state in 1940 (as rural roads were paved) and for federal taxes in 1960
(with the onset of the interstate era).
The interstate highway system beginning in the 1950s increased the
federal role in the ﬁnancing of US highways. First, new interstates were
to be untolled (though toll roads that had been built from 1940 on were
grandfathered into the system). Second, the federal government would
pay 90 per cent of the cost, recovered primarily through federal gasoline
taxes, leaving the states to match only 10 per cent to build the freeway.
Lower level roads remained state responsibilities, although with the 1991
passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Eﬃciency Act, a much
larger National Highway System became eligible for federal funds, with a
reduced 80 per cent federal, 20 per cent state matching plan.
4.0 Developers
In the past several decades, especially with the decline in real gasoline tax
revenues, local governments have begun to connect the need for new infra-
structure with new development (Altshuler and Gomez-Iban ˜ ez, 1993;
Bauman and Ethier, 1987; Heath et al., 1989; Lee, 1989; Levinson, 1998;
Nelson, 1989). Historically developers had been required to provide infra-
structure on the site they were developing, but more recently, oﬀ-site
improvements have been required. There are several legal tools that are
useful for extracting resources from developers.
Developers may voluntarily provide infrastructure (or cash for infra-
structure) to a jurisdiction, a system called proﬀers. In exchange, developers
may obtain some sort of approval, often a rezoning or other permission to
develop. When the required (or desired) infrastructure is expensive and
beyond the scope of a single developer, multiple developers may join
together and form a road club, signing an agreement with the relevant
jurisdiction, in exchange for collective permission. The voluntary nature
of these agreements may be considered suspect by members of the
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develop at the legally allowed limit without a proﬀer. That limit may be too
low a density to be considered proﬁtable, however.
Communities may do away with the veneer of voluntarism and impose
some form of exaction. An exaction is a requirement that developments pay
money (or build infrastructure in kind) in exchange for approval. These, in
the form of impact fees, became especially popular in California following
the adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978, which greatly limited the rate of
property taxes that could be collected by local governments. In Nollan
vs. California Coastal Commission (483 US 825 (1987)) the United States
Supreme Court required there to be a nexus between the conditions
(ﬁnancial or otherwise) imposed on the development and ‘legitimate state
interests’ the government is trying to extend. In a later case, Dolan vs.
City of Tigard (512 US 319, 114 S.CT. 2309 (1994)), the Supreme Court
ordered ‘rough proportionality’ between the exactions and the public
impact of the project. That said, most jurisdictions in the United States
at present do not exact conditions from developers that at all compensate
for the development’s impact on infrastructure.
Another way to achieve this end is the formation of development districts
wherein developers would be permitted to proceed with development upon
payment into a fund that prospectively covers the cost of all needed
(planned) infrastructure.
A ﬁnal alternative is the use of beneﬁt districts (Stopher, 1993). In a
beneﬁts district, the value of property goes up as a result of the infra-
structure having been built, due to the additional accessibility or reduction
in congestion that the facility provides. Charging a premium (above and
beyond the already increased assessment that should arise when property
values increase) can be used to defray retrospectively the cost of the
infrastructure or pay back the bonds. This is more widely used with rail
projects, but can be associated with new highways as well.
We can organise these developer-payment tools according to their
timing (prospective — before the infrastructure is built, or retrospective
— after the infrastructure is built), whether they are voluntary or manda-
tory, and whether the geography applied is a particular development site,
or a larger area, as shown in Table 2. One could further consider the
Table 2
Types of Developer Payments
Site-Based Area-Based
Voluntary Proﬀers Road Club
Mandatory Exaction Development District (prospective) Beneﬁt District (retrospective)
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can be used in these scenarios. One can imagine that it would be diﬃcult
to impose retrospective ﬁnancing in anything but a mandatory, area-
based way.
5.0 Vehicle Type
The United States federal government has paid particular attention to cost
allocation. Federal Highway Cost Allocation Studies (HCAS) were com-
pleted in 1982 and again in 1997, and aim to determine the responsibility
of diﬀerent vehicle classes (cars, trucks by type) to the cost of roads, includ-
ing both infrastructure and social costs. In the US, cars, pickups, and vans,
generally owned by individuals, comprised 92.4 per cent of vehicle distance
travelled (FHWA, 1997). However, the costs imposed by trucks are more
signiﬁcant than then the 7.4 per cent of distance travelled may suggest.
First, paving thickness is determined by truck weight per axle (an equiva-
lent standard axle loading or ESAL is often used). So all roads that wish
to accommodate trucks must be thicker even though cars do not require
it. The truck-highway-paving system could perhaps be more optimal if
the country had a diﬀerent mix of vehicles, and more axles on vehicles
(Small, Winston and Evans, 1989), which a diﬀerent tax/toll structure
might be able to induce. The disjoint ownership of vehicles and roadways
may make some ineﬃciencies inevitable. Even if the paving problem was
addressed, there are a variety of other costs that trucks impose on roads.
Bridges must be stronger to bear the entire weight of the truck, a cost
that is also captured in various cost allocation eﬀorts. Overall the federal
highway cost responsibility for trucks estimated by FHWA, considering
both paving and bridges, is just over 40 per cent, while they are estimated
to pay in user fees just under 36 per cent (FHWA, 1997). The cost allocation
system according to the FHWA is least fair to pickups and vans, small
single-unit trucks, and small combination trucks, which overpay by 40,
50, and 60 per cent respectively, while large single-unit trucks and combina-
tion trucks underpay by 50 per cent.
This analysis does not consider a number of other costs trucks impose.
Trucks also determine grade and banking (or superelevation) on roads. In
short, nearly 100 per cent of roads today are designed based on constraints
imposed by fewer than 3.3 per cent of all vehicles and 8 per cent of all
vehicle distance travelled. The cost of decreasing the grade of roads
systematically has never been calculated, and is at this point in history in
the US largely a sunk cost.
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or capacity), is determined by peak period travel, primarily passenger
cars and individually owned trucks. Excess capacity cannot be rolled up
at night.
6.0 An Example
Consider the case illustrated in Figure 3. We can use it to illustrate the
spatial and temporal issues with a variety of ﬁxed cost ﬁnancing schemes.
Assume that equal-sized areas a and b are the only two residential sub-
divisions of jurisdiction j. It is generally accepted that residents (or
developers) of area a pay for the on-site improvement that is cul-de-sac
u, and area b pays for cul-de-sac v. (See for example Levinson, 2002, Chap-
ter 5). How to pay for links z and y remains to be resolved. Assume publicly
provided, pay-as-you-go roadways, which is typical in the United States.
First, assume that development a comes before development b. In that
case, it is likely that the residents or developers of a, who comprise all of
the residents of j, pay for z. This is fair in that the users of z have paid
for z. Problems (or opportunities) arise because of indivisibilities in the
road network. Assume link z is one lane in each direction, which provides
excess capacity beyond what is required by the residents of a. A second
developer proposes to build subdivision b. As part of that development,
the on-site link v is constructed. Who pays for link y? The developer of b
may suggest that since it is oﬀ-site, the whole community (both residents
of a and b) should share the costs. If this occurs, the residents of a will
have paid for all of link z and half of link y, while the residents of b will
have only paid for half of link y. Clearly the residents of b are at an advan-
tage. The existing residents of a may on the other hand try to exact link y as
an oﬀ-site improvement from developer b, in which case, the residents of a
will have paid for link z and the residents of b will have paid for link y,
which sounds fairer, but the residents of b still use link z (while few residents
Figure 3
Timing and Sequence of Development
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been subsidised.
The developer of b may note that the residents of a had use of the road
before b even existed, and would have had to pay for z had b never
happened, so that it is fair. If the developer is economically astute, he
may also note that traﬃc from link b does not add to the marginal costs
of constructing link z, and so the residents of a are really no worse oﬀ
sharing the capacity.
A solution to the temporal problem would be to fund link z using bonds
rather than using a pay-as-you-go system, bonds that are paid back by the
whole community in jurisdiction j over the life of the facility (Levinson,
2001). When residents move into b, they pay taxes that help repay the
bonds, ensuring that facility z is there when it is needed for residents in a,
and paid for in proportion to use by residents of both a and b. However,
this does not resolve the problem of paying for link y. If the same mechan-
ism is used, then residents of a pay for a facility they do not use, thereby
subsidising the residents of development b. Bonds paid by all residents,
which works like a club, is only fair if all facilities are used approximately
equally by all users. If one set of residents (for example those in b) place an
undue burden, they should pay extra.
A solution to the spatial problem would be to fund each link based on
which development caused its construction; this is the approach taken by
impact fees. So link z would be charged to subdivision a and link y
would be charged to subdivision b, again resulting in an eﬀective subsidy
for subdivision b.
A solution isrequired to addressboththe spatialand temporalfree-rider
problems, one that would result in the costs of link z being shared by a and
b, while link y is paid for solely by subdivision b. It is here that the question
of sector of ownership and the tying of ﬁnancing to payment arises. Were
the road private, or managed by an independent turnpike authority, the
ﬁnancing would clearly switch from the public to the user. If the annual
cost to build links z and y were denoted Cz and Cy, and the annual
number of trips out of subdivisions a and b were Ta and Tb respectively,









On the other hand, were the links to be separately privately owned by
organisations with a proﬁt-maximising objective, the issue of serial
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 39, Part 3
290monopolies arises (Chamberlin, 1933), which would lead to higher prices
for consumers than if they were jointly owned, which remains higher
than a welfare-maximising toll (zero if there are no marginal costs) or an
average cost recovery toll noted above.
These problems would not arise were there no indivisibilities or
economies of scale, but of course there are in real networks.
Now assume that subdivision b comes before subdivision a. In that case,
b must build links y and z in order to have access, and subdivision a gets to
ride free. Society as a whole must pay more up-front costs (the same
number of people could have lived in jurisdiction j without link y if sub-
division a had gone ﬁrst), illustrating some disadvantages of leapfrog
development. The other set of issues remains however.
7.0 Conclusions
Over history, a variety of techniques have been employed to ﬁnance the
ﬁxed costs of roadway infrastructure: collecting revenues from the general
public, users, and developers, diﬀerentiating users by type, discriminating
based on willingness to pay, to either cover total costs, or to earn proﬁt.
The examination of history and investigation of a speciﬁc example may
give us insight into the future.
The costs of collecting revenues from tolls should drop with the advent
of electronic toll collection (despite the experience in London), while rising
congestion creates additional incentive to employ user-based ﬁnancing
systems. Mohring and Harwitz (1962) show that revenue from optimal con-
gestion pricing covers the capital costs of the optimal level of infrastructure
under certain conditions, including constant returns to scale in congestion
and capacity expansion. However, as Verhoef (2000) notes, conditions are
seldom optimal, leading to what is called ‘second-best’ pricing, such as the
HOT lanes, cordon tolls, and area based tolls that are now being deployed,
which do not have such economically convenient properties.
The absence of pricing surely requires additional funding for the ﬁxed
costs of infrastructure, while ineﬃcient pricing may lead to shortfalls as
well. While roads are considered a public service, average cost pricing,
with careful attribution and allocation of costs temporally, spatially, and
by user class will still be required for both eﬃciency and equity. Roads
that are privatised have diﬀerent objectives, though they may either be
regulated much like public utilities, which again returns to some form of
average cost pricing, or allowed to be truly proﬁt maximising, using
price-discrimination to diﬀerentiate users by their willingness to pay.
Paying for the Fixed Costs of Roads Levinson
291References
Albert, W. (1972): The Turnpike Road System in England, 1663–1840, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Albert, W. (1979): ‘Popular Opposition to Turnpike Trusts in Early Eighteenth Century
England,’ Journal of Transport History, 5, 57–68.
Altshuler, A. and J. Gomez-Iban ˜ ez (1993): Regulating for Revenue: the Political Economy
of Land Use Exactions, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution.
Baer, C. T., D. B. Klein and J. Majewski (1993): ‘From Trunk to Branch: Toll Roads in
New York, 1800–1860,’ Essays in Economic and Business History, XI, 191–209.
Bauman, G. and W. Ethier (1987): ‘Development Exactions and Impact Fees: a Survey of
American Practices,’ Law and Contemporary Problems, 50, 51–68.
Beito, D. T. and B. Smith (1990): ‘The Formation of Urban Infrastructure Through Non-
Governmental Planning: The Private Places of St Louis,’ Journal of Urban History, 16,
263–303.
Blewett, R. and A. Nelson (1988): ‘A Public Choice and Eﬃciency Argument for Impact
Fees,’ in A. Nelson (ed): Development Impact Fees: Policy Rationale, Practice, Theory,
and Issues, Chicago, IL, American Planning Association, 281–9
Bell, M. G. H., M. A. Quddus, J. D. Schmoecker, and A. Fonzone (2004): ‘The Impact of
the Congestion Charge on the John Lewis Retail Sector in London,’ Imperial College,
London, Centre for Transport Studies.
Bogart, D. (2003): ‘Institutional Innovation and Infrastructure Investment: an Evaluation
of the Turnpike System in Eighteenth Century England,’ Draft, 26 November. http://
aris.ss.uci.edu/econ/paper/2003-04/Bogart-02.pdf.
Bogart, D. (2004): ‘Turnpike Trusts and the Transportation Revolution in Eighteenth
Century England,’ Draft, 7 January. http://orion.oac.uci.edu/~dbogart/transport_
revolution_feb12_two.pdf.
Bogart, D. (2005): ‘The Diﬀusion of Turnpike Trusts in Eighteenth Century Britain: An
Analysis of Institutional Change,’ Working paper, University of California at Irvine,
Department of Economics.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965): The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Library of Economics
and Liberty. http://www.econlib.org/library/Buchanan/buchCv5c9.html (Accessed 10
June 2005 from the World Wide Web).
Chamberlin, E. (1933): The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the
Theory of Value, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Cobin, J. (1999): ‘Market Provision of Highways: Lessons from Costanera Norte,’
Planning and Markets 2, issue 1, article 3 http://www-pam.usc.edu/volume2/
v2i1a3print.html.
Cornes, R. and T. Sandler (1996): The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club
Goods,2
nd Edition, Cambridge University Press.
de Palma, A. and R. Lindsey (1997): ‘Private Toll Roads: a Dynamic Equilibrium,’ no 97-
057/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute.
Elliott, W. (1975): ‘The Los Angeles Aﬄiction: Suggestions for a Cure,’ The Public Inter-
est, Winter.
Federal Highway Administration (1997): 1997 Federal Highway Cost Allocation Study –
Summary Report, Washington, DC, FHWA, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/hcas/
summary/sum1.html#introduction.
Field, B. G. (1992): ‘Road Pricing in Practice,’ Transportation Journal, 5–14.
Fielding, G. J. and D. B. Klein (1993): ‘How to Franchise Highways,’ Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy, 25, 113–30.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 39, Part 3
292Garrison, W. and D. Levinson (2005): The Transportation Experience: Policy, Planning,
and Deployment, Oxford University Press (in press).
Gomez-Iban ˜ ez, J. A. (1992): ‘The Political Economy of Highway Tolls and Congestion
Pricing,’ Transportation Quarterly, 46, 343–60.
Gomez-Iban ˜ ez, J. and J. Meyer (1993): Going Private: The International Experience with
Transport Privatization. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution.
Hambros, S. G. (1999): Public–Private Partnerships for Highways: Experience, Structure,
Financing, Applicability and Comparative Assessment, Objective One Final Report for
Council of Deputy Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety,
March.
Heath, D. C., G. Kreger, G. Orlin, and M. Riesett (1989). ‘Traﬃc Impact Fees,’ in
A. Nelson (ed), Development Impact Fees, Chicago, IL, APA Press, 188–203.
Hensher, D. (2003): ‘Congestion Charging: What Sydney Can Learn from London,’ On
Line Opinion: Australia’s e-journal of social and political debate. Posted 22 September
2003. http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=735 (accessed 16 June 2005).
Holland, E. P. and P. L. Watson (1978): ‘The Design of Traﬃc Pricing Schemes,’ Trans-
portation Engineering, 48, 32–8.
Hunter, J. K. (1988): Westmoreland and Portland Places – The History and Architecture of
America’s Premier Private Streets, 1888–1988, Columbia, MO, University of Missouri
Press.
Klein, D. B. (1990): ‘The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies
of Early America,’ Economic Inquiry.
Lafayette Square Marquis (1998): ‘Benton Place: The Nation’s Oldest Private
Street,’ http://www.lafayettesquare.org/marquis/december98/benton.html 7 December
1998.
Larsen, O. I. (1995): ‘The Toll Cordons in Norway – an Overview,’ Journal of Transport
Geography, 3, 187–98.
Lay, M. G. (1992): Ways of the World: A History of the World’s Roads and of the Vehicles
That Used Them, Rutgers University Press.
Lee, D. (1989): ‘Evaluation of Impact Fees against Public Finance Criteria,’ in A. Nelson
(ed), Development Impact Fees, Chicago, IL, APA Press, 290–312.
Level 3 Communications (2003): ‘Form 10-K/A-1 Securities and Exchange Commission
Consolidated Financial Statements,’ Available at: http://www.shareholder.com/
Common/Edgar/794323/1047469-03-13081/03-00.pdf (Accessed 10 June 2005).
Levinson, D. (2001): ‘Financing Infrastructure Over Time,’ Journal of Urban Planning and
Development, American Society of Civil Engineers, 127, 146–57.
Levinson, D. and B. Yerra (2002): ‘Highway Costs and the Eﬃcient Mix of State and
Local Funds,’ Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research
Board, 1812, 27–36.
Levinson, D. (1998). ‘The Limits to Growth Management,’ Environment and Planning B,
24, 689–707.
Levinson, D. (2002): Financing Transportation Networks, Northampton, MA, Edward
Elgar Publishers.
McCormack, J. and R. Rauch (1997): ‘Initial Thoughts on the Mexican Toll Road
Restructuring,’ BradyNet Inc. http://www.bradynet.com/n036.html.
Mohring H. and M. Harwitz (1962): Highway Beneﬁts, Evanston, IL, Northwestern
University Press.
Moore, W. B. and T. Muller (1991): ‘Impacts of Development and Infrastructure
Financing,’ Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 117, 95–107.
Nelson, A. (1989): Development Impact Fees. Chicago, IL, APA Press.
Paying for the Fixed Costs of Roads Levinson
293Newbery, D. M. and G. Santos (1999): ‘Road Taxes, Road User Charges and Earmark-
ing,’ Fiscal Studies, 20, 103–32.
Nicholas, J., A. Nelson and J. Juergensmeyer (1991): A Practitioner’s Guide to Develop-
ment Impact Fees, Chicago, IL, APA Press.
Odlyzko, A. (2004): ‘The Evolution of Price Discrimination in Transportation and its
Implications for the Internet,’ Review of Network Economics, 3, 323–46.
Pawson, E. (1977): Transport and Economy: The Turnpike Roads of Eighteenth Century
Britain, New York, Academic Press.
Payne, P. L. (1956): ‘The Bermondsey, Rotherhithe and Deptford Turnpike Trust: 1776–
1810,’ Journal of Transport History, 1, 132–43.
Rothengatter, W. (2004): ‘The Relevance of Transeuropean Transport Networks for
Integration and Growth in the Extended European Union,’ Contribution to the
Milan Workshop on European Economic Policy.
St Louis (2001): ‘Community Planning’ http://stlouis.missouri.org/government/heritage/
history/planning.htm.
Small, K. A., C. Winston and C. A. Evans (1989): Road Work: A New Highway Pricing
and Investment Policy, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution.
Stopher, P. (1993): ‘Financing Urban Rail Projects: the Case of Los Angeles,’ Transporta-
tion, 20, 229–50.
Sullivan, E. C. (1998): ‘Evaluating the Impacts of the SR 91 Variable Toll Express Lane
Facility, Final Report,’ San Luis Obispo, CA, California Polytechnic State University.
Tarr, J. A. and C. D. Jacobson (1996): ‘No Single Path: Ownership and Financing of
Infrastructure in the 19th and 20th Centuries,’ in A. Mody (ed), Infrastructure Deliv-
ery: Private Initiative and the Public Good, Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1–35.
Train, K. (1991): Optimal Regulation, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
Turvey, R. (2003): Road and Bridge Tolls in Nineteenth Century London.
Utt, R. D. (1999): ‘How Congressional Earmarks and Pork-Barrel Spending Undermine
State and Local Decisionmaking,’ Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1266, 2 April
1999, http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1266.html.
Verhoef, E. (2000): ‘The Implementation of Marginal External Cost Pricing in Road
Transport: Long Run vs Short Run and First-Best vs Second-Best,’ Papers in Regional
Science, 79, 307–32.
Viton, P. A. (1995): Private Roads, Journal of Urban Economics, 37, 260–89.
Wachs, M. (2003): ‘A Dozen Reasons for Gasoline Taxes,’ Public Works Management and
Policy,7, 235–42.
Walton, C. M. and M. Euritt (1990): ‘Highway Finance and the Private Sector: Issues and
Alternatives,’ Transportation Research A, 24, 265–76.
Webb, S. and B. Webb (1913): English Local Government: The Story of the King’s Highway,
London, Longmans, Green and Co.
Wooldridge, S. C., M. J. Garvin, Y. J. Cheah, and J. B. Miller (2002): ‘Valuing Flexibility
in Private Toll Road Development: Analysis of the Dulles Greenway,’ The Journal of
Project and Structured Finance, 25–36.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 39, Part 3
294